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State Machine Replication (SMR) solutions often divide time into rounds, with a designated leader driving decisions in each round.
Progress is guaranteed once all correct processes synchronize to the same round, and the leader of that round is correct. Recently
suggested Byzantine SMR solutions such as HotStuff, Tendermint, and LibraBFT achieve progress with a linear message complexity
and a constant time complexity once such round synchronization occurs. But round synchronization itself incurs an additional cost.
By Dolev and Reischuk’s lower bound, any deterministic solution must have Ω(n2) communication complexity. Yet the question of
randomized round synchronization with an expected linear message complexity remained open.
We present an algorithm that, for the first time, achieves round synchronization with expected linear message complexity and
expected constant latency. Existing protocols can use our round synchronization algorithm to solve Byzantine SMR with the same
asymptotic performance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Byzantine State Machine Replication (SMR) has received a lot of attention in recent years due to the increasing demand for
robust and scalable systems. In order to tolerate periods of high load or even denial-of-service attacks, practical solutions
commonly assume the eventual synchrony model [12], meaning that they guarantee consistency despite asynchrony
and make progress during periods when the network is synchronous. Examples of such systems include PBFT [10],
SBFT [16], LibraBFT [2], HotStuff [25], Zyzzyva [20], Tendermint [8], and many more. Eventually synchronous SMR
solutions typically iterate through a sequence of rounds, (also called views), where in each round a designated leader
process tries to drive all correct processes to consensus. The main complexity of such algorithms lies in the so-called
view-change protocol, whence a new round’s leader collects information about possible consensus decisions in previous
rounds.
In the last couple of years there has been a race to improve the performance of Byzantine SMR. Recent algorithms
such as Tendermint [7], HotStuff [28], and LibraBFT [2] have introduced view-change mechanisms with constant time
complexity and linear message complexity. Thus, even if every consensus instance is led by a different leader, the
message complexity for each decision remains linear. Nevertheless, the linear complexity view-change is achieved only
after all correct processes synchronize to execute the same round of the protocol. And such round synchronization
has a cost of its own. In Tendermint, round advancement is gossiped throughout the system, entailing O(n logn)
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message complexity withO(logn) latency; in HotStuff it is delegated to a separate round synchronization module called
PaceMaker, whose implementation is left unspecified; and in LibraBFT, this module is implemented with quadratic
message complexity, which in fact matches Dolev and Reischuk’s Ω(n2) communication complexity lower bound [11]
on deterministic Byzantine consensus. Later work on Cogsworth [22] implemented a randomized PaceMaker with
expected constant latency and linear message complexity under benign failures, but with expected quadratic message
complexity in the Byzantine case.
A Byzantine SMR protocol needs to make sure that eventually a correct leader emerges and drives progress. The
challenge is that a correct process might perceive progress even with a faulty leader while other correct processes
make no progress. It is possible to overcome this difficulty by having all processes broadcast their decisions to all other
processes [10], but this incurs an all-to-all communication cost. Instead, we focus on the approach used in [2], where
processes constantly advance in rounds with rotating leaders, ensuring that in an infinite run, there are infinitely many
round synchronization events with a correct leader.
In this work we present a new round synchronization algorithm that achieves expected constant time complexity
and expected linear communication complexity even in the presence of Byzantine processes. Specifically, under an
oblivious adversary, we guarantee these bounds on the expected time/message cost until all processes synchronize to
the same round from an arbitrary state of the protocol. Under a strong adversary, we achieve the same bounds but
only on the average expected time and message cost until round synchronization over all states occurring in an infinite
run of the protocol. To this end, we decompose the round synchronization module into a synchronizer abstraction and
two local functions. The synchronizer abstraction thus captures the essence of the distributed coordination required in
order to synchronize processes to the same round.
The main technique used in our algorithm is relay-based message distribution. Instead of broadcasting messages
all-to-all, with quadratic message complexity, our algorithm sends each message to a designated relay. The relay
aggregates messages from multiple processes, and when a certain threshold is met, it combines them into a threshold
signature, which it sends it to all the processes. This leads to linear communication complexity per message. The
challenge is that the relay can be Byzantine and, for example, send the aggregated message only to a subset of the
processes. Another challenge arises when some correct process advances to a new round while others lag behind. We
introduce a relay-based linear-complexity helping mechanism to allow lagging processes to catch up with faster ones,
without all-to-all broadcast.
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is reducing the expected message complexity of Byzantine SMR in the
presence of Byzantine faults to linear, while maintaining expected constant latency. The rest of the paper is structured
as follows: §2 describes the model; §3 formally defines the round synchronization problem and our performance metrics;
§4 explains our decomposition of round synchronization into a synchronizer abstraction and local functions, and proves
that this decomposition solves the round synchronization problem; §5 presents our new synchronizer algorithm and
proves its expected linear message complexity, expected constant latency, and correctness; §6 gives related work and §7
concludes the paper.
2 MODEL
Our model consists of a set Π = {𝒫1,𝒫2, . . . ,𝒫n } of n processes. Every two processes in Π have a bidirectional, reliable,
and authenticated link between them, i.e., every process can send a message to another process that will eventually
arrive and the recipient can verify the sender’s identity.
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We follow the eventually synchronous model [12] in which there is no global clock, and every execution is divided
into two periods: first, an unbounded period of asynchrony, where messages may take arbitrarily long to arrive; and
then, a period of synchrony, where messages arrive within a bounded time, δ . The second period begins at a moment
called the Global Stabilization Time (GST). All messages sent before GST arrive by GST + δ . Processes are not aware of
the time when GST occurs but do know δ .
We consider a failure model where f < n/3 processes may be faulty, or Byzantine and act arbitrarily. Correct
processes may start their local executions at different times.
We assume a shared source of randomness, ℛ, unforeseen by the adversary, that is used to derive a function
Relay(r ,k) : N × {1, . . . , f + 1} 7→ Π. This function is used to select for each round r the k-th process that will act as a
relay. The relay function satisfies the following properties:
R1 f + 1 different relays for each round:
∀r ∈ N,∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ f + 1 : Relay(r , i) , Relay(r , j).
R2 Random relay selection, while ensuring f + 1 different relays for each round:
∀r ∈ N,∀1 ≤ k ≤ f + 1,∀𝒫1,𝒫2 ∈ Π \
k−1⋃
i=1
Relay(r , i) : Pr [Relay(r ,k) = 𝒫1] = Pr [Relay(r ,k) = 𝒫2].
Note that R2 implies that the first relay is continuously rotated throughout the run, i.e., ∀r ∈ N : ⋃∞i=r Relay(i, 1) = Π.
All randomness is captured in the relay function. An algorithm using this function is defined as a deterministic state
machine, where state transitions are associated with actions, e.g., sending and receiving messages on the links between
the processes. We assume that the adversary has no knowledge of the randomness. Such an adversary is known in
the literature as an oblivious adversary [3, 6, 13]. This adversary allows us to bound the expected time to constant
and message complexity to linear until round synchronization for all protocol states. See §7 for a discussion on the
implication of strengthening the adversary model.
We use a cryptographic signing scheme, a public key infrastructure (PKI) to validate signatures, and a threshold
signing scheme [5, 9, 24]. The threshold signing scheme is used in order to create a compact-sized signature of K-of-N
processes as in other consensus protocols [9]. Usually K = f + 1 or K = 2f + 1. We assume that the adversary is
polynomial-time bounded, i.e., the probability that it will break the cryptographic assumptions in this paper (e.g., the
cryptographic signatures, threshold signatures, etc.) is negligible.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION - ROUND SYNCHRONIZATION
We start by specifying the round synchronization problem is in §3.1, then discuss performance metrics in §3.2, and
conclude by describing how to use a round synchronization module to solve consensus in §3.3.
3.1 Specification
We define a long-lived task of round synchronization, parameterized by the desired round duration ∆. It has a single
output signal at process 𝒫i , round_leaderi (r ,𝒫), r ∈ N,𝒫 ∈ Π, indicating to 𝒫i to enter round r of which 𝒫 is
the leader. We say that a process 𝒫i is in round r between the time t when round_leaderi (r , ·) occurs and the next
round_leaderi (r ′, ·) event after t . If no such event occurs, 𝒫i remains in round r from t onward. We call time ts in a
run a synchronization time if all correct processes are in the same round r from ts to at least ts + ∆, and r has a correct
leader.
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A round synchronization module satisfies two properties. The first ensures that in every round all the correct
processes have the same leader.
Property 1 (Leader agreement). For any two correct processes 𝒫i ,𝒫i′ if round_leaderi (r ,𝒫j ) and round_leaderi′(r ,𝒫j′)
occur, then 𝒫j = 𝒫j′ .
The second property ensures that eventually all the correct processes are jointly in a round with a correct leader for
a sufficiently long time. Formally:
Property 2 (Eventual round synchronization). For every time t in a run, there exists a synchronization time after t .
3.2 Performance metrics
We measure the maximum expected performance after GST under all possible adversary behaviors and protocol states,
where the expectation is taken over random outputs of our randomness source ℛ, which drives the relay function.
In more detail, let S be the set of all reachable states of a round synchronization algorithm, and let 𝒜 be the set of all
possible adversary behaviors after GST. This includes selecting up to f processes to corrupt and scheduling all message
deliveries within at most δ time. For a state s ∈ S , and adversary behavior a ∈ 𝒜, let RS(s,a,π ) be the time from when
s occurs until the next synchronization time in a run extending s with adversary behavior a and the relay function
derived from the random bits π ∈ ℛ.
The expected latency of the round synchronization module is defined as
max
s ∈S
a∈𝒜
{
E
π ∈ℛ [RS(s,a,π )]
}
.
In a similar way, to define message complexity letM(s,a, r ) be the total number of messages correct processes send
from state s until the next synchronization time in a run extending s with adversary a ∈ 𝒜 and relay output π ∈ ℛ.
The message complexity is defined as
max
s ∈S
a∈𝒜
{
E
π ∈ℛ [M(s,a,π )]
}
.
Note that the definition for the expected latency and message complexity is for the worst-case, i.e., we take the
maximum expected latency and message complexity over all states and adversary behaviors. This strong definition
requires us to assume an oblivious adversary. If the performance metrics were defined as the average latency and
message complexity over all states, or the average over an infinite run, we could have assumed a strong adversary and
still get expected constant latency and linear message complexity for our algorithm which is presented in §5.
For brevity, in the rest of this paper, we omit the parameters s , a, π , and simply bound the expected latency or
message cost over all reachable states and adversary behaviors.
3.3 Using round synchronization to solve consensus
In HotStuff [25], Theorem 4 states the following in regards to reaching a decision in the consensus protocol:
“After GST, there exists a bounded time period Tf such that if all correct replicas remain in view v
during Tf and the leader for view v is correct, then a decision is reached.”
The round synchronization module allows reaching exactly the conditions of the theorem, i.e., an eventual round that
all the correct processes are in at the same time for at least ∆ = Tf , and the leader that of that round is correct.
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Given a round synchronization module with expected linear message complexity and expected constant latency,
HotStuff solves consensus in the same expected asymptotic message complexity and latency.
Note that, in general, processes know neither whether their leader is correct nor whether all correct processes are
in the same view as them. Indeed, it is possible for a set of f + 1 correct processes (and f Byzantine ones) to make
progress in a round with a Byzantine leader, while f correct processes are stuck behind. In an SMR algorithm where
the processes communicate only with the leader of each round and do not broadcast decisions to all processes, this
scenario is indistinguishable from one where the leader is correct and all correct processes make progress. Therefore,
to ensure the condition required by HotStuff (and captured by Property 2), we continuously advance in rounds and
change leaders, regardless of the progress made.
4 ROUND SYNCHRONIZATION DECOMPOSITION
We build the round synchronization module using a synchronizer abstraction. The abstraction’s properties appear in
§4.1, and a round synchronization module using this abstraction is given in §4.2.
The latter consists of a timer function that paces the synchronizer and a leader function that outputs the leader and
round to the application. This decomposition is illustrated in Figure 1.
4.1 Synchronizer
We define a synchronizer abstraction to be a long-lived task with an API that includes an advancei () input and a
new_roundi (r ) signal, where r ∈ N.
In a similar way to the round synchronization module, we say that process 𝒫i enters round r when new_roundi (r )
occurs. We say process 𝒫 is in round r during the time interval that starts when 𝒫 enters round r and ends when it
next enters another round. If the process does not enter a new round, then it remains indefinitely in r . We denote by
r_max(t) the maximum round a correct process is in at time t .
We define four properties a synchronizer algorithm should guarantee. The first ensures that rounds are monotonically
increasing. Formally:
Property 3 (Monotonically increasing rounds). For each correct process 𝒫i , if new_roundi (r ′) occurs after
new_roundi (r ), then r ′ > r .
The next property is the validity of new rounds.
Property 4 (Validity). If a correct process signals new_round(r ) then some correct process called advance() while in
round r − 1.
We next define the two liveness properties. Informally, the first ensures the stabilization of at least f + 1 correct
processes to the same maximum round, and the second ensures progress after the stabilization.
Property 5 (Stabilization). For any t during the run, let t0 be the first time when a correct process enters round r_max(t).
If no correct process enters any round r > r_max(t), then:
S1 From some time t1 onward, at least f + 1 correct processes are in round r_max(t).
S2 If t0 ≥ GST and Relay(r_max(t), 1) is correct, then from some time t2 onward all the correct processes enter r_max(t)
and t2 − t0 ≤ c1 for some constant c1.
The next property ensures progress.
Property 6 (Progress). For any t during the run, if f + 1 correct processes in round r_max(t) call advance() by t0, and no
correct process calls advance() while in any round r > r_max(t) then:
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Synchronizer
advance()
Timer
new_round(r)
Leader
round_leader(r, P)
Round Synchronization (Δ)
Distributed abstraction
Local function
Fig. 1. Round synchronization using the synchronizer abstraction.
P1 From some time t1 onward, there is at least one correct process in r_max(t) + 1.
P2 If t0 ≥ GST and Relay(r_max(t), 1) is correct, then from some time t2 onward all the correct processes enter
r_max(t) + 1 and t2 − t0 ≤ c2 for some constant c2.
Property P2 is not required for round synchronization, but it gives a bound on performance.
4.2 From synchronizer to round synchronization
We now describe how to use the synchronizer abstraction to implement round synchronization. The implementation
uses two local functions: a timer function that paces a process’ advance() calls, and a leader function that maps a round
to a leader using the Relay function. This construction is illustrated in Figure 1, and specified in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1: Round synchronization using the synchronizer abstraction.
1 Timer:
2 after c1 + ∆ from last new_round(r ): // c1 is defined in S2.
3 advance()
4 Leader:
5 on new_round(r ):
6 round_leader(r, Relay(r, 1))
We prove that this construction provides round synchronization. Let t0 = GST and ∀ℓ ≥ 1 let tℓ be the first time
after tℓ−1 that a correct process enters a new maximum round. We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. In an infinite run of Alg. 1, tℓ eventually occurs for any ℓ ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove this by induction on ℓ. Based on the model, the base step of the induction, t0 = GST eventually
occurs.
Next, let us look at some tℓ during the run. If by some action of the adversary, tℓ+1 occurs, then we are done.
Otherwise, by S1 eventually at least f +1 correct processes enter r_max(tℓ). Denote this set of processes by P . The timer
function ensures that eventually every process in P calls advance(), meaning there are at least f + 1 correct processes
in r_max(tℓ) that call advance(). By P1, eventually at least one correct processes enter r_max(tℓ+1) = r_max(tℓ) + 1
and we are done. □
We prove the main theorem of this section:
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Fig. 2. The message flow of the algorithm. A process enters round r when it receives a commit message for round r , the circled
numbers represent the different stages of the algorithm (see Alg. 2). Only the 2f + 1 correct processes are illustrated.
Theorem 4.2. Using a synchronizer abstraction, Alg. 1 implements a round synchronization module.
Proof. Since the relay function’s outputs are identical among all correct processes and the leader local function
outputs round_leader(r ,Relay(r , 1)), it is immediate that the leader agreement property (Property 1) is satisfied.
We now prove eventual round synchronization (Property 2). Define Leader(ℓ) ≜ Relay(r_max(tℓ), 1). By Lemma 4.1,
tℓ occurs for all ℓ ≥ 0, and since the first relay for each round is randomly chosen, eventually, with probability 1, there
exists a tℓ such that Leader(ℓ) is a correct process. Let us look at r_max(tℓ).
By S2, between tℓ and tℓ + c1, all correct processes enter r_max(tℓ). Since the timer function calls advance() c1 + ∆
after a correct process enters a new round, no correct process calls advance() in r_max(tℓ) until tℓ + c1 + ∆. By validity
(Property 4), this guarantees that all correct processes remain in r_max(tℓ) until tℓ+c1+∆, so tℓ+c1 is a synchronization
time, as needed. □
5 AN EXPECTED LINEAR MESSAGE COMPLEXITY AND CONSTANT LATENCY SYNCHRONIZER
In this section we present a synchronizer abstraction algorithm with expected linear message complexity and constant
latency in the Byzantine case.
We start by describing the main ideas used to lower the message complexity (while still guaranteeing constant
latency) in §5.1. We give a more in-depth description of the algorithm in §5.2, reason about the algorithm’s correctness
in §5.3 and performance in §5.4.
5.1 Achieving linear complexity
The crux of the algorithm is a relay-based distribution of messages among processes. A standard Byzantine broadcast
system [7], which ensures that a message sent by a correct process is eventually delivered by all other correct processes,
usually requires quadratic message complexity for each message disseminated. This is because Byzantine broadcast
protocols such as Bracha’s [7] have a correct process that delivers a message also send it to all the other processes,
resulting in all-to-all communication for each delivered message.
In our algorithm, we instead use a single designated process as a relay. Processes send their messages to the relay,
which aggregates messages from a number of processes, combines them into one message using a threshold signature,
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and broadcasts it to all the processes. This mechanism reduces the total number of protocol messages from O(n2) to
O(n).
A difficulty arises if the relay is Byzantine. We overcome this as follows: when a process 𝒫 sends a message to a
relay, it expects a response from it within a certain time-bound. If no timely response arrives, 𝒫 can deduce that either
GST has not occurred yet and the message to/from the relay is delayed, or it is after GST and the relay is Byzantine. In
either case, after the allotted time passes, 𝒫 proceeds to send a message to a different relay, again waiting for the new
relay to respond in a timely manner, and so on. This mechanism uses the relay function described in §2. Once a correct
relay is contacted, the algorithm makes progress. In expectation, the number of consecutive Byzantine relays until a
correct one is bounded by 3/2, leading to expected constant latency and linear message complexity. In the worst-case,
each round has f + 1 potential relays, guaranteeing that at least one of them is correct, which ensures liveness.
5.2 Algorithm description
At a high level, the goal of the algorithm is to eventually enter all rounds during the run, and reach a synchronization
time in every round r where Relay(r , 1) is a correct process. If the relay is Byzantine, then the goal is to eventually
move from r to r + 1. The randomization of the relay function guarantees that in an infinite run there will be infinitely
many rounds with a correct process as the first relay, guaranteeing an infinite number of synchronization times.
Message flow of the algorithm. The algorithm is presented in Alg. 2, and its message flow is depicted in Figure 2.
Protocol messages are signed and verified; for brevity, we omit the signatures and their verification from the algorithm
description and pseudocode.
A process sends to Relay(r ,k) messages of the form ⟨message type, r ,k⟩, where r and k are natural numbers, and
message type is one of the following: pre-commit, commit, or finalize. The relay’s messages to the processes are threshold
signatures on an aggregation of the same messages, denoted
〈
pre-commit, r ,k
〉
,
〈
commit, r ,k
〉
, and
〈
finalize, r ,k
〉
,
respectively. Each threshold signature is created using some number (f + 1 or 2f + 1) of signatures.
When a process invokes advance() to indicate that it wants to move from a round r − 1 to round r , it sends a
pre-commit message to the relay (this is stage 1 of the algorithm). Once f + 1 processes indicate that they wish to move
to round r , the relay broadcasts a pre-commit message (stage 2). The reason f + 1 processes are needed to initiate the
first stage of the algorithm is to ensure that there is at least one correct process among them, preventing Byzantine
processes from causing correct ones to advance prematurely. Any process receiving a relay’s pre-commit message in a
round r ′ < r joins in by sending a commit message for r (stage 3). When 2f + 1 processes indicate that they commit to
moving to r , the relay sends a commit (stage 4) and processes that receive it enter that round (stage 5). Requiring 2f + 1
processes to commit to a round r before entering it ensures that at least f + 1 correct processes are aware of the intent
to enter r . This ensures that at least f + 1 correct processes will eventually enter r , and those f + 1 processes guarantee
progress, as it is the minimal quorum required to initiate the stages of the algorithm to the next round, until a round
with a first correct relay is reached and in that round a synchronization time will occur.
However, the algorithm for synchronizing for round r does not end when a process receives a commit message for r .
Rather, a process that enters round r sends a finalize message to help any lagging processes with the transition to round
r . Once 2f + 1 finalize messages are sent, the relay broadcasts a finalize message (stage 6), and when a process receives
it, it completes the algorithm for round r (stage 7). The finalization phase is needed to overcome cases of a Byzantine
relay that does not send the commit message to all the processes.
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Variables and timeouts. The variable curr_round stores the current round a process is currently in which changes in
stage 5, and next_round indicates to what round the process is attempting to enter. The value of next_round becomes
curr_round + 1 when a process invokes advance(), and it can become higher if the process learns (via a pre-commit) of
at least f + 1 other processes that want to advance to a higher round than the one the process is currently in.
The timeouts at the bottom of the pseudocode dictate when a process moves to the next relay of a round. When a
process sends a message to a relay, it expects the relay to respond within 2δ , which is the upper bound of the round-trip
time after GST. For example, if a process sends a message of round r to Relay(r ,k) at time t and does not receive a
response by t + 2δ , it sends the message to Relay(r ,k + 1). This continues up to Relay(r , f + 1), guaranteeing that at
least one of the relays for round r is correct.
Upon a timeout, a process sends a pre-commit message to the next relay in line, and once that relay gets f+1 such
messages, it, too, can try to complete the protocol for the same round.
There is a tradeoff involved in choosing the timeout âĂŞ a shorter timeout may cause a second relay to engage even
when the first relay is correct, whereas a longer one delays progress in case of a Byzantine relay. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that a process responds to all relays, so contacting the (k + 1)-st relay for round r does not in any way
prevent the k-th one from making progress. Thus, while setting an aggressive timeout may cause the protocol to send
more messages, it does not in any way hamper progress. A process that partakes in the protocol to advance to round r
contacts a new relay every 2δ time for as long as it does not make progress in the phases of the algorithm for round r .
Since a process takes an expected 6δ to complete the algorithm for round r , the process contacts 3 relays in expectation.
The round_relay array holds the highest relay for each round the process sent a pre-commit message to. For example,
round_relay[r ] = k for k > 1 indicates that the process sent ⟨pre-commit, r , 1⟩ , . . . , ⟨pre-commit, r ,k⟩ messages to
Relay(r , 1), . . . ,Relay(r ,k), respectively. Note that a process sends a pre-commit message for round r to Relay(r , 1)
when it first receives a pre-commit message in stage 3, regardless of the relay it received the message from. In a similar
way, a process sends a commit message for round r to Relay(r , 1) in stage 5. This is to allow the first relay of round r
to complete the stages of the algorithm in case it is correct, and make sure that round synchronization will occur in
round r .
We note that the round_relay array is introduced in the pseudocode for simplicity. In a real implementation of the
algorithm, only the rounds between curr_round and next_round need to be stored each time, limiting the amount of
memory needed for an actual implementation.
Example. To help clarify the need for the last phase of the algorithm consider the following scenario: Suppose a set P
of f + 1 correct processes are in round r − 1 and invoke advance(). The remaining f correct processes are in a round
r ′ < r − 1. The processes in P send a pre-commit message to Relay(r , 1), which is Byzantine. The relay generates a
threshold signature and sends a pre-commit only to the processes in P , which respond with a commit message. Now,
Relay(r , 1), with the help of f Byzantine processes, creates a commit message for r , but sends it to only one correct
process 𝒫i in P . This results in a scenario where 𝒫i is the only correct process in round r , while f correct processes
remain in round r − 1 and continue to timeout and send pre-commit messages to the relays of round r . Since a relay
needs at least f + 1 pre-commit messages to engage the stages of the algorithm, unless 𝒫i continues to help the rest of
the processes in P by sending pre-commit messages, they might get stuck in round r − 1. Therefore, processes continue
to timeout and send pre-commit messages in the previous round until they receive a finalize message. Once a process
in r receives a finalize message for r , it knows that there are at least f + 1 correct processes in round r . These f + 1
correct processes will eventually call advance() and proceed to round r + 1.
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Algorithm 2: Synchronizer Algorithm. The circles show the protocol’s stages.
1 initialize:
2 curr_round← 0 // Processes begin their execution at round 0.
3 next_round← 0
4 ∀i ∈ N : round_relay[i] ← 1
5 finalized← True
Every process:
1
6 on advance():
7 if curr_round < next_round then // old round
8 return
9 next_round← curr_round + 1
10 send ⟨pre-commit, next_round, 1⟩ to Relay(next_round, 1)
Relay (Relay(r, k )):
2
11 upon receiving the first valid f + 1 ⟨pre-commit, r, k ⟩
messages:
12 broadcast
〈
pre-commit, r, k
〉
3
13 upon receiving the first valid
〈
pre-commit, r, k
〉
from
Relay(r, k ):
14 if r < next_round then // old round
15 return
16 if r > next_round then // start participating in round r
17 next_round← r
18 send ⟨pre-commit, r, 1⟩ to Relay(r, 1) ;
19 send ⟨commit, r, k ⟩ to Relay(r, k )
4
20 upon receiving the first valid 2f + 1 ⟨commit, r, k ⟩ messages:
21 broadcast
〈
commit, r, k
〉
5
22 upon receiving the first valid
〈
commit, r, k
〉
from
Relay(r, k ):
23 if r < curr_round then // old round
24 return
25 if r > curr_round then // enter round r
26 curr_round← r
27 finalized← False
28 send ⟨commit, r, 1⟩ to Relay(r, 1)
29 new_round(r ) // signal new round
30 send ⟨finalize, r, k ⟩ to Relay(r, k )
6
31 upon receiving the first valid 2f + 1 ⟨finalize, r, k ⟩ messages:
32 broadcast
〈
finalize, r, k
〉
7
33 upon receiving the first valid
〈
finalize, r, k
〉
from
Relay(r, k ):
34 if r = curr_round then
35 finalized← True
Timeouts (for every process):
36 on pre-commit and commit timeouts: /* Every 2δ from last sending pre-commit or commit messages and not receiving the
matching pre-commit or commit */
37 if round_relay[next_round] < f + 1 then
38 round_relay[next_round] ← round_relay[next_round] + 1
39 send ⟨pre-commit, next_round, round_relay[next_round]⟩ to Relay(next_round, round_relay[next_round])
40 on finalize timeout: /* Every 2δ from last sending finalize and not receiving the matching finalize */
41 if round_relay[curr_round] < f + 1 and finalized = False then
42 round_relay[curr_round] ← round_relay[curr_round] + 1
43 send ⟨pre-commit, curr_round, round_relay[curr_round]⟩ to Relay(curr_round, round_relay[curr_round])
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5.3 Correctness
Next, we prove that the algorithm satisfies the properties of a synchronizer, as defined in §4.1.
Lemma 5.1. The algorithm satisfies monotonically increasing rounds (Property 3).
Proof. The algorithm signals new_round(r ) in stage 5 only when it receives a commit message for a round r that is
larger than the one the process is currently in. Therefore, a process enters rounds in monotonically increasing order. □
Lemma 5.2. The algorithm satisfies round validity (Property 4).
Proof. A correct process enters round r when it is a round r ′ < r and receives a commit message for r . A commit
message is a threshold signature of (2f + 1)-of-n commit messages, meaning at least f + 1 are from a correct process.
A correct process sends a commit message for round r when it receives a pre-commit message for r . A pre-commit
message is a threshold signature of (f + 1)-of-n pre-commit messages, meaning at least one correct process sent a
pre-commit message for round r .
Denote 𝒫i as the first correct process that sends a pre-commit message for r during the run. A correct process
only sends a pre-commit for r (in Lines 10, 18, 39, and 43) when its next_round round or curr_round variable holds r .
This former changes in one of two places âĂŞ Line 9 when a process calls advance(), and Line 17 on receiving a valid
pre-commit for r . The latter changes on receiving a valid commit for r . Because no pre-commit or commit message can
be sent for round r before at least one correct process sends a pre-commit for r , then 𝒫i must have sent its pre-commit
message for round r when it changed its next_round in Line 9, i.e., on executing advance(). □
Proposition 5.3. If a correct process receives a finalize for round r at time t , then at least f + 1 correct processes entered
round r by t .
Proof. Let t be a time in which a correct process received a finalize message. This message is a threshold signature
of (2f + 1)-of-n finalize messages, of which at least f + 1 originated from correct processes. A correct process only sends
a finalize message for r if it receives a commit message for r , which means that it is already in round r by time t . □
Lemma 5.4. The algorithm satisfies the synchronizer’s stabilization property (Property 5), with c1 = 4δ .
Proof. Let t be a point in time during the execution and r = r_max(t). We assume that no correct process enters
during the run any round r ′ > r . Let 𝒫i be the first correct process that enters round r at time t0. Such a process exists
by the definition of r_max(t). 𝒫i is at round r , so it received a commit message for round r . A commit message is a
threshold signature of (2f + 1)-of-n commit messages, at least f + 1 of which were sent by correct processes. Denote by
S the set of correct processes whose signatures on commit messages are included in the commit message 𝒫i received.
The processes in S are either in round r at time t or in smaller rounds r ′′ < r .
We now prove the two sub-properties of Property 5:
S1. If some correct process receives finalize for round r , by Proposition 5.3, there are at least f + 1 correct processes
in r and we are done.
Assume no correct process receives finalize. Then, the processes in S continue to timeout and send pre-commit
messages for round r to the relays of r . This guarantees that eventually, a correct relay for r receives at least f + 1
pre-commit messages, as Property R1 of the relay function ensures f + 1 different relays for each round. This relay
eventually completes the algorithm, allowing all correct processes to advance to round r .
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S2. Because 𝒫i receives commit for round r at time t0, as argued above, f + 1 correct processes have sent a commit
message for round r by time t0. Because a process sends pre-commit to Relay(r , 1) before sending a commit to any relay
for round r (Lines 10 or 18), these messages, too, are sent by time t0. Therefore, by time t0 + δ , Relay(r , 1) receives f + 1
pre-commit messages and sends a pre-commit message to all processes. By t0 + 2δ all the correct processes receive the
pre-commit message sent from the first relay, by t0 + 3δ the relay receives 2f + 1 commit messages (along with any
process that already entered r , Line 28), and by t2 ≤ t0 + 4δ all the correct processes receive the commit message and
enter round r . □
Next, we prove the progress property of a synchronizer.
Lemma 5.5. The algorithm satisfies the synchronizer’s progress property (Property 6), with c2 = 4δ .
Proof. Let t be a certain point in time during the execution, r = r_max(t), and assume that by some time t0, at least
f + 1 correct processes call advance() while in round r and not while in any round r ′ > r . By Lemma 5.2, no correct
process enters any round r ′′ > r + 1, i.e., the above group of at least f + 1 processes can eventually be in either round
r or r + 1 (by Property 3, rounds are monotonically increasing so they cannot be in any round lower than round r ).
Denote this group of processes by S .
We now prove the two sub-properties of Property 6:
P1. Once some correct process receives finalize for round r + 1, by Proposition 5.3, there are at least f + 1 correct
processes in r and we are done.
Assume no correct process receives finalize. Then, the processes in S continue to timeout and send pre-commit
messages for round r + 1 to the relays of r + 1. This guarantees that eventually, a correct relay for r + 1 receives at least
f + 1 pre-commit messages, as Property R1 of the relay function ensures f + 1 different relays for each round. This
relay eventually completes the algorithm, allowing all correct processes to advance to round r + 1.
P2. Assume Relay(r + 1, 1) is correct. By t0 at least f + 1 correct processes call advance() while in round r , therefore,
by t0 +δ Relay(r + 1, 1) receives enough pre-commit messages for round r + 1 to engage the first phase of the algorithm,
and by t0 + 2δ all the correct processes receive the pre-commit message, and by t0 + 3δ the relay receives 2f + 1
commit messages. Even if a process enters round r + 1 thorough a different relay than Relay(r + 1, 1), it still sends to
Relay(r + 1, 1) the commit message for round r + 1 (in Line 28). Thus, the first relay has enough commit messages, and
by t2 ≤ t0 + 4δ all the correct processes receive the commit message and enter round r + 1. □
Theorem 5.6. Alg. 2 satisfies the synchronizer abstraction.
Proof. We showed that the algorithm satisfies the monotonically increasing rounds, validity, stabilization, and
progress properties of the abstraction and therefore fulfills the synchronizer abstraction. □
5.4 Performance: latency and message complexity
We now prove that our algorithm achieves expected constant latency and linear message complexity.
Proposition 5.7. For any round r , let Xr be the number of relays until the first correct one. Then, ∀r : E [Xr ] ≤ 32 .
Proof. Since the relays for each round r are randomly chosen regardless of r , the expectation of Xr is the same for
all r , and for brevity, we omit the round notation.
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Based on the definition of X , and the fact that relays for each round are randomly chosen without replacement:
Pr [X = x] = Pr [Y = x − 1] · x
n − (x − 1) ,
where Y is a hypergeometrical distribution with the following parameters: Y ∼ HG(n, f ,x − 1). Thus, for any n and
f < n/3:
Pr [X = x] = Pr [Y = x − 1] · n − f
n − (x − 1) =
( f
x−1
) ( n−f
x−1−(x−1)
)( n
x−1
) · n − f
n − (x − 1)
=
f ! (n − x + 1)!
n! (f − x + 1)! ·
n − f
n − (x − 1)
And in expectation
E [X ] =
f +1∑
x=1
x Pr [X = x] =
f +1∑
x=1
x · f !(n − x + 1)!
n!(f − x + 1)! ·
n − f
n − x + 1 =
n + 1
n − f + 1 ≤
3
2 .
□
Lemma 5.8. Consider a run in which no process enters a round greater than r , and a correct process 𝒫i enters round
r at t0. Let t1 be the first time in the run when f + 1 correct process are in r (by S1, there exists such a time), then
E [t1 −max {t0,GST}] ≤ 32 · 6δ .
Proof. 𝒫i enters round r at t0 so it receives a commit message at t0. This message contains signatures of 2f + 1
processes, of which at least f + 1 are correct. These processes have all sent pre-commit messages to Relay(r , 1) before
sending their signed commit messages, no later than t0. Each of these processes waits up to 2δ for a pre-commit from
Relay(r , 1), and if it is received, waits at most 2δ for a commit, and if it is received, waits again at most 2δ for a finalize.
Thus, within 6δ , one of the following occurs:
(1) At least one such process receives finalize, which by Proposition 5.3 means that t1 has occurred.
(2) All processes timeout and send pre-commit to the next relay, and the process is repeated.
Because (2) only occurs if the relay is Byzantine, and by Proposition 5.7 the expected number of relays until a correct
one is bounded by 3/2, we get that E [t1 −max {t0,GST}] ≤ 32 · 6δ = 9δ . □
Lemma 5.9. Consider a run in which f + 1 correct processes call advance() while in round r by time t0, and no correct
process calls advance() in rounds larger than r . Let t1 be the first time in the run when a correct process is in r + 1 (by P1,
there exists such a time), then E [t1 −max {t0,GST}] ≤ 32 · 6δ .
Proof. Let S be the set of processes that call advance() in round r by t0. The reasoning for this property is very
similar to the one in the proof of Lemma 5.8, i.e., since the processes in S timeout at most every 6δ until they move to
the next relay of round r + 1, and there are enough processes in S to eventually send f + 1 pre-commit messages to a
correct relay, and once this relay is found it can complete the stages of the algorithm. In expectation, the time until t1
depends on the number of Byzantine relays until a correct one. By Proposition 5.7 it is bounded by 3/2, and therefore
E [t1 −max {t0,GST}] ≤ 32 · 6δ = 9δ . □
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Theorem 5.10. The synchronizer algorithm along with a Timer local function (as defined in §4) achieves expected
constant latency and linear message complexity.
Proof. The latency for our algorithm is based on the definition in §3.2. We go over all possible states after GST the
correct processes in our algorithm can be in, and look at the expected latency until the synchronization time.
Let t0 = GST and for all ℓ ≥ 1 let tℓ represent the first time after tℓ−1 that a correct process enters a new maximum
round. By Lemma 4.1, in an infinite run, tℓ eventually occurs for any ℓ ≥ 0.
For any time t ≥ GST during the run, let sync_time(t) be the first time after t until a synchronization time. To calculate
the expected latency of our algorithm, we need to show that for any t ≥ GST, E1 ≜ E [sync_time(t) − t] ≤ O(δ ).
Denote E2 as the expected time from t until the next tℓ , and E3 ≜ E
[
tℓ+1 − tℓ ] . If Relay(r_max(tℓ), 1) is correct,
then by tℓ + 4δ all the correct processes enter r_max(tℓ) (by P2). Therefore:
E1 ≤ E2 + n − f
n︸︷︷︸
Probability that
Relay(r_max(t ℓ ), 1)
is correct
· 4δ︸︷︷︸
The maximum time for
all correct processes
to enter a round
+
f
n︸︷︷︸
Probability that
Relay(r_max(t ℓ ), 1)
is Byzantine
·E
[
sync_time(tℓ+1) − tℓ
]
︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
The expected time until all
correct processes
enter r_max(sync_time(t ℓ+1))
= E2 +
n − f
n
· 4δ + f
n
· (E1 + E [tℓ+1 − tℓ ]︸          ︷︷          ︸
=E3
)
⇒ E1 ≤ n
n − f
(
E2 +
n − f
n
· 4δ + f
n
· E3
)
. (1)
Assuming that once a correct process enters a new round, the timer calls advance() within 4δ + ∆, and that ∆ = O(δ ),
the expected time between tℓ and tℓ+1 is consisted of the following:
E3 = E
[
tℓ+1 − tℓ
]
≤ E
[ Time from t ℓ until
at least f + 1 correct
processes to enter r_max(t ℓ )
]
︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
Lemma 5.8
+ 4δ + ∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time until at least f + 1
correct processes
call advance() in r_max(t ℓ )
+E
[ Time for the first
correct processes to
enter r_max(t ℓ+1)
]
︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
Lemma 5.9
≤ 32 · 6δ + 4δ + ∆ +
3
2 · 6δ = 22δ + ∆ = O(δ ).
The calculation of E3 proves that in expectation, the time between any tℓ and tℓ+1 is constant. In expectation, the
time from any t ∈ [tℓ , tℓ+1] until tℓ+1 is also expected constant. This is the definition of E2, and therefore after GST,
E2 ≤ O(δ ).
To conclude, we proved that E2 ≤ O(δ ) and E3 ≤ O(δ ), and by Eq. (1), E1 ≤ O(δ ), as needed to prove expected
constant latency.
For message complexity of the synchronizer, note that since the expected time between two occurrences of round
synchronization is expected constant, the message complexity is expected linear. This is because for a given round the
number of consecutive Byzantine relays until a correct one is expected constant, and in the algorithm, every process
sends one message to the relay in each stage of the algorithm, and the relay responds with one message to all the
processes. Even if a process contacts more than one relay per round, it still contacts an expected constant number of
relays, and therefore this does not hamper the asymptotic linear message complexity. □
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6 RELATEDWORK
Algorithms for the eventual synchronymodel almost invariably use the notion of round or views [4, 17, 21, 23]. A number
of works have suggested frameworks and mechanisms for round synchronization in the benign case [1, 14, 15, 18, 19].
For example, Awerbuch introduced synchronizers [1] for failure-free networks. TLC [14] places a barrier on round
advancement, so that processes enter round r + 1 only after a threshold of the processes entered round r . Frameworks
like RRFD [15] and GIRAF [18, 19] create a round-based structure for eventually synchronous and failure-detector
based algorithms.
In the context of Byzantine SMR, HotStuff [25] specified the round synchronization conditions needed for their
algorithm, and abstracted it into a module that was left unspecified. Our work provides the round synchronization they
require.
Our algorithm builds on ideas presented in Cogsworth [22], but Cogsworth achieved expected linear message
complexity only in the benign case, whereas in the Byzantine case its message complexity was still expected quadratic.
To reduce the expected message complexity to linear, we modified Cogsworth in a number of ways, including adding
another phase to the algorithm, signing each message from a process to a relay with the relay it is intended for, and
adding a “helping” mechanism to help processes “catch-up” to the latest round. By incorporating these ideas into our
algorithm, we managed to bring the expected message complexity down to linear.
7 CONCLUSION
We presented an algorithm that reduces the expected message complexity of round synchronization to linear with an
expected constant latency. Combined with algorithms like HotStuff, this yields, for the first time, Byzantine SMR with
the same asymptotic performance, as round synchronization is the “bottleneck” in previous Byzantine SMR algorithms.
While we achieve only expected sub-quadratic complexity, we note that achieving the same complexity in the worst-case
is known to be impossible [11], and so cannot be improved.
One aspect that may be revisited in future work is the adversary model, as our work considers an oblivious one,
which might be strengthened. For example, the latency and message complexity can be defined as the average expected
time until round synchronization is reached in an infinite run, after GST. This way, we can strengthen the adversary
model to a strong adversary, and still achieve expected constant latency and linear message complexity.
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